Last 10 Monthly Index Values
| Date: | 11/2009 | 12/2009 | 01/2010 | 02/2010 | 03/2010 | 04/2010 | 05/2010 | 06/2010 | 07/2010 | 08/2010 |
| Value: | 101.85 | 97.43 | 99.04 | 98.66 | 98.34 | 97.86 | 97.95 | 96.87 | 93.60 | 92.71 |
Consumer Metrics InstituteHistoric Charts and Commentary |
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| Date: | 11/2009 | 12/2009 | 01/2010 | 02/2010 | 03/2010 | 04/2010 | 05/2010 | 06/2010 | 07/2010 | 08/2010 |
| Value: | 101.85 | 97.43 | 99.04 | 98.66 | 98.34 | 97.86 | 97.95 | 96.87 | 93.60 | 92.71 |
| Daily Growth Index Past 60 Days(1): | ||
 (Click on chart for fuller resolution) | ||
| Notes: (1) The daily values for the Consumer Metrics Institute's 91-day 'Trailing Quarter' Growth Index over the past 60 days. Please see our Frequently Asked Questions page for a more complete description of our Growth Index. |
| Quarter Ending Date | GDP Growth Rate | DGI Same Value Date | Lead Time (Days) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2009: 6/30/2009 | -0.7% | 12/28/2008 | 184 |
| Q3 2009: 9/30/2009 | 2.2% | 6/2/2009 | 120 |
| Q4 2009: 12/31/2009 | 5.6% | 8/25/2009 | 128 |
| Q1 2010: 3/31/2010 | 3.7% | 11/18/2009 | 133 |
| Q2 2010: 6/30/2010 | 1.6% | 12/13/2009 | 199 |
 | September 1, 2010 - Viewing the "Great Recession" in Hi-Def: The "Great Recession" that began in 2008 has had many nuances, some of which can only be seen in data with higher resolution than that provided by the BEA or NBER. Our day-by-day profile of consumer demand helps us understand triggering events while also making it clear that many recent changes in consumer behavior have begun to linger -- much as the recession itself now appears to have done. We have previously reported that consumer demand for discretionary durable goods is now at recessionary levels after starting to contract on a year-over-year basis on January 15, 2010. On the surface this would indicate a "double-dip" recession following the 2008 economic event. We may have inadvertently promoted the "double-dip" aspect of 2010's contraction by often graphing the two events superimposed upon each other in our "Contraction Watch" chart -- as though they were independent episodes:  (Click on chart for fuller resolution) But to even a casual observer there is something unsettling in the above chart, especially if we've been told that the "Great Recession" was a once-in-a-lifetime event that required once-in-a-lifetime amounts of new national debt to fix. Clearly, the 2010 contraction already appears well on the way to equaling or exceeding the "Great Recession" in severity despite those "fixes." By the end of August, the 2010 contraction had out-lasted the "Great Recession" in duration, and was contracting at a rate that we might expect to see only once in every 15 years. But it is highly unlikely that two fully independent contractions this severe would happen only two years apart -- just as the 1937 recession is not generally thought to be just another closely spaced severe recession, but is rather seen in the proper context. Perhaps we need to take a look at our longer term charts, including our 48 months of Weighted Composite Index data (a nominal base 100 index where 100 = zero net year-over-year change):  From this perspective, we might reasonably ask whether the upward bump that reached a daily peak on August 12, 2009 is a "Great Recovery" or merely a stimulus fueled anomaly within a longer term economic slowdown. If the latter is true, then the shape of the 2010 contraction in our "Contraction Watch" chart makes more sense; we might be seeing now how the 2008 event would have progressed without generous doses of short term consumer stimuli during 2009 (e.g., "Cash for Clunkers" and the Federal Housing Tax Credit). Our data also indicates that the "Great Recession" unfolded for consumers differently than National Bureau of Economic Research ("NBER") might have us believe. The NBER is considered to be the official scorekeeper for recessions, and they have dated the beginning of the "Great Recession" to December 2007. While it is true that consumer demand (as measured by our Daily Growth Index) peaked prior to that month (on July 28, 2007 to be exact), we find that during December 2007 consumer demand was still growing year-over-year by more than 1% -- slow growth perhaps, but hardly a recession. In fact, on December 13, 2007 some sectors of consumer demand were almost giddy in their growth: housing was still growing at a 12.8% year-over-year rate while our retail department chain index was up double digits. Consumers were clearly not yet in any major funk. By May 26, 2008 -- nearly two quarters after the NBER claims we were already in a recession -- consumer demand for discretionary durable goods had finally slipped into year-over-year net contraction. By that time the consumer climate had changed: crude oil was topping $130 per barrel and the collapse of Bear Stearns was in the nightly news. Additionally, in the U.S. the presidential primaries were in full swing, bringing with them unprecedented political uncertainty. When the timing of consumer behavior changes is better understood, the triggering events can be more readily identified. By May 2008 consumers had good reasons to be cautious about big-ticket discretionary expenditures -- reasons that simply had not existed six months earlier. Similarly, the lowest levels of consumer demand we have ever recorded occurred on November 5, 2008 while the entire nation reflected on the results from the preceding day's elections. That was followed by an organic rebound in demand that brought the entire consumer economy into net growth by early January 2009, long before any major fiscal stimulus had reached the streets. The consumer climate had once again changed: oil was $33 per barrel and the election was behind us. Again, higher resolution data can help sort out cause and effect, making policy responses better timed and targeted. Economic cycles are complex and economic cause-effect relationships can often be ambiguous. In May, 2008 unemployment was still only 5.4%, and the downturn that we monitored in consumer demand preceded and plausibly caused at least a portion of the subsequent rise in joblessness. Now, over two years later, the cause-effect relationship has at least been muddled and arguably flipped: on the one hand we have observed high unemployment levels persisting throughout the artificially stimulated "green shoots"; while on the other hand we see in our daily data that rising unemployment concerns inversely correlate with dropping overall consumer demand for discretionary durable goods. Unfortunately this means that unemployment has remained sticky in the face of positive stimuli while discretionary consumer demand remains free to float down on bad news or increased uncertainties. Contrary to the timeline suggested by the NBER, our data strongly suggests that the consumer portion of this recession did not start out to be about housing or damaged consumer balance sheets. But it is now. It has clearly evolved, and the average consumer's version of a recession diary might look something like this: ► December, 2007: Spending slightly more than last year, sub-prime mess is somebody else's problem ► May, 2008: Gas prices way up, banking crisis in the news -- maybe we need to be little cautious ► August, 2008: Democratic National Convention says things really are getting different this time, maybe more caution is warranted ► November, 2008: Good, the election's over, and gas prices are down -- things are getting normal again ► March, 2009: The 401K may be hurting, but at least we have the house to retire on ► June, 2009: Unemployment numbers don't look good, but those usually start back down ► August, 2009: A lot of vacant houses in the neighborhood, let's rethink retirement funding ► January, 2010: Unemployment is getting worse, let's pay down our credit cards ► May, 2010: There may be a recovery going on somewhere else, but it certainly ain't here ► August, 2010: Politics are getting ugly again, things aren't about to improve anytime soon There probably hasn't been two separate recessions in three years, simply one that has evolved in significant ways. But if this really is a "double dip" recession, then our data indicates that the "Great Recession" of 2008 was merely the precursor, and not the main event. It is this current dip that we should be really concerned about; the current contraction in consumer demand is about structural changes in consumer behavior, whereas the "first dip" was about short term loss of consumer confidence. This recession has been complex and constantly evolving in ways that policy makers have not been able to understand through their low resolution lenses. As a consequence their policy responses have been misguided, ineffective and wasteful. The Federal Reserve may be able to save the banking system by being the "lender of last resort", but it is powerless to change perhaps the one thing that John Maynard Keynes got right -- and what he mischaracterized as a "Paradox of Thrift" -- as over 100 million U.S. households become economic "loose cannons", acting exclusively in their own best interests in 100 million different ways. | |
| | August 28, 2010 - Inside the BEA's Latest GDP Numbers: On August 27, the Bureau of Economic Analysis ("BEA") of the U.S. Department of Commerce revised downward their previously reported measurement of the U.S. Economy's growth for the 2nd quarter of 2010. The newly reported annualized growth rate is 1.6%, down from a 2.4% rate published just 28 days earlier -- a 33% downward revision of the growth rate in four weeks. The BEA now reports that the past three quarters of annualized GDP growth have been (in sequence from Q4-2009) 5.0%, 3.7% and 1.6% -- with the rate dropping 2.1% from Q1-2010 to Q2-2010, the sharpest decline in the annualized growth rate since the summer of 2008.  (Click on chart for fuller resolution) Another quarter like the second quarter would put the entire economy into governmentally admitted contraction, despite the nearly $649 billion in stimulus spent or in the process of being spent. With only about $143 billion remaining between unstarted projects and unclaimed tax cuts, it is hard to see how the residual stimulus funds will reverse the trends obvious in the above chart. Another set of numbers within the BEA report addresses a more natural part of any economic cycle: the tendency of factories and distribution channels to over-correct inventory levels during times of economic expansion or contraction. Over recent quarters factories had been building inventory levels in anticipation of a sharp and sustained recovery from the "Great Recession". During the past three quarters that inventory building added 2.83%, 2.64% and 0.63% to the published GDP numbers. Notice the drop between the last two numbers; that more than 2% drop in that inventory component from Q1-2010 to Q2-2010 mirrors the reported 2.1% decline in the overall GDP growth rate -- indicating that the cutback in inventory build-ups alone can explain most of the quarterly drop in the published growth rate. During the "Great Recession" of 2008 the inventory adjustments swung sharply negative, lowering the published GDP by as much as 2.31% during the fourth quarter of 2008. It is clear from the 2% drop between Q1-2010 and Q2-2010 that the current cycle of inventory building has collapsed. If the BEA's (often late arriving) inventory data should swing negative (as it did in the third quarter of 2007), the published numbers for the third quarter 2010 GDP could well be negative. As the chart above shows, our measurements of on-line consumer demand for discretionary durable goods are substantially more negative than the BEA's published GDP for the full economy. Our year-over-year Daily Growth Index peaked in August, 2009 and started net year-over-year contraction on January 15, 2010. Our numbers differ from the BEA's for a number of reasons (more fully explained in several of our FAQs), but suffice it to say that: ► The only portions of the $649 billion in spent stimulus reflected in our data are the consumer packages (such as "Cash for Clunkers" and the Housing Tax Credits), which both contributed to our August 2009 peak and have now lapsed; ► Our consumers and the types of purchases we track them buying are leading and highly volatile -- which is precisely why we track them. We constructed our indexes to provide an advanced look at how an economic cycle is progressing. The best tool we have for that is our "Contraction Watch", which overlays graphically the day-by-day progression of the current 2010 contraction onto the "Great Recession" of 2008: (Click on chart for fuller resolution) In the above chart the two contractions are aligned on the left margin at the first day during each event that our Daily Growth Index went negative, and they progress day-by-day to the right tracing out the daily rate of contraction. The key take-away from our "Contraction Watch" is that the profile of this contraction episode is different, principally (at this stage) in the longevity of the event. The "Great Recession" had a contraction duration of 221 days. The current 2010 contraction event has already lasted longer, and we cannot even begin to guess when it might end. Several months ago we had commented that the shape of the current 2010 contraction episode was developing in a relatively mild but persistent manner -- likening it to a "walking pneumonia", in sharp contrast to 2008's "call 911" severity. That analogy is no longer valid. If we realize that the total economic pain inflicted by a contraction event is a function of both the daily contraction rate and the duration of the event, then the best measure of that pain is simply the area in the above chart between each of the curves and the gray "zero" axis. The "Great Recession" of 2008 accumulated slightly over 793 negative-percent-contraction-days. Within a week, current 2010 event will be over 500, and even should it suddenly reverse and trace out a 2008-like recovery arc, the total pain will be very near 2008's total. Given our data on how political "Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt" negatively impacted consumer spending on discretionary durable goods in 2008, we anticipate no miraculous upsurge in U.S. consumer discretionary spending before November 2. Barring some sudden reversal in consumer attitudes and habits, the 2010 economic slowdown will be longer and at least as painful as the one experienced in 2008. Furthermore, the shape of this contraction event indicates that it is probably not an independent "double dip", but simply a continuation of the "Great Recession" of 2008 after a few quarters of now lapsed consumer stimulation. | |
| | August 20, 2010 - Politics and the Economy; Cause and Effect: At the Consumer Metrics Institute we have a unique perspective on the economy. We measure consumer demand on a daily basis, providing nearly two orders of magnitude more resolution than the BEA's GDP releases. This is like moving from naked eye observations to using a lab-grade microscope. As a result we can see timing relationships that simply can't be seen in quarterly data. Last month the BEA revised their GDP readings for the 4th quarter of 2008, now over 18 months old. In so doing, they have reported for the first time (at least in their data) that the Great Recession's annualized "growth" rate bottomed in the 4th quarter of 2008, not the 1st quarter of 2009 as they had been telling us for over a year. Although it is always disconcerting to have history revised, this particular revision was hardly news to us, since our daily data has always recorded the Great Recession's absolute bottom occurring on November 5th, 2008:  (Click on chart for fuller resolution) November 5th, 2008 is also interesting for political reasons, occurring one day after the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election. In fact, the two worse days of consumer demand we have ever recorded were on November 5th and 6th, 2008, with a sharp rebound starting on November 7th -- substantially earlier than the BEA had previously reported and four months before the lagging equity markets finally bottomed. The daily time resolution within our data gives us a unique opportunity to document and quantify the impact of political events on consumer demand. The political uncertainty leading up to and immediately following the 2008 election is a glaringly obvious example. Three days after the election, the very worst of the "fear, uncertainty and doubt" ("FUD") had passed, and consumers resumed their earlier upward trending demand. The subsequent growth resulted in daily year-over-year net growth by the end of November and 10% daily year-over-year growth by Christmas:  (Click on chart for fuller resolution) The above chart of 52 weekly averages for our Weighted Composite Index (September 2008 through August 2009) shows that the sharp, downward political-uncertainty "blip" actually descended from an otherwise already upward trending baseline of consumer demand -- which had previously bottomed in August 2008 (coincident with the Democratic National Convention). Remember that our data only reflects consumer demand for discretionary durable goods. Even in uncertain times people buy groceries and gasoline. But increasing demand for discretionary durable goods is what grows the economy, and political uncertainty (or at least political high drama) spoils the collective consumer appetite for major purchases. If nothing else, the daily resolution in our data suggests that: ► In 2008 political "FUD" exacerbated (to at least some extent) the Great Recession. ► Any political "FUD" in the second half of 2010 might do the same thing to the current Great Recovery, such as it is. The bottom line? A good predictor for the course of the Great Recovery over the next 90 days might be whether U.S. politicians are collectively singing "Kumbayah" or "Eve of Destruction". Our Daily Growth Index has reached a year-over-year contraction rate of 5%, and it is rapidly closing the gap on the worst contraction rate observed during the 2008 Great Recession: (Click on chart for fuller resolution) The current 2010 contraction is now over 215 days old. At the same point during the duration of the 2008 Great Recession, consumer demand was contracting at less than a 1% year-over-year rate. Additionally, during the 2008 Great Recession our Daily Growth Index had returned to net growth after 223 days. From the above chart we can see that the profile of the 2008 contraction and the 2010 contraction are substantially different. The 2008 event was a classic "V" shaped recession. So far this one is not. We have previously suggested that this contraction might be mild but prolonged. We are no longer confident about "mild". We have previously gained some notoriety for having our Daily Growth Index lead the GDP by a relatively consistent 18-20 weeks during the Great Recession. Does this mean that we expect the GDP a couple of quarters from now to be contracting at rates similar to our current -5% rate? ► Our methodologies capture only on-line consumer demand for discretionary durable goods, the most volatile portion of the consumer's 70% contribution to the GDP. As a consequence we are not seeing the impact of most ongoing governmental stimuli. If governmental stimulus packages can successfully offset the 2010 drop in consumer demand, the GDP might never feel the full weight of the 2010 contraction event. ► However, as we have said before, we suspect that consumers are the "800 pound gorilla" in this recession, and their actions (or inactions) will ultimately be felt to a major extent in the GDP. By analogy to (American) football statistics, we are only measuring the performance of the starting quarterback for the U.S. economic team. It is possible for a football team to win even though the quarterback is below average -- an overwhelming defense and a punishing running game can compensate for a journey-man quarterback -- but the performance of the starting quarterback is by far the best predictor of a football team's final results. The U.S. economy might grow without the U.S. consumer's support, but only with net exports and/or unsustainable governmental consumption. At the current time the likelihood of the U.S. becoming a net exporter is very low, and unsustainable governmental consumption is simply that: unsustainable. It is also helpful to distinguish between "leading" and "predicting"; we have deliberately decided to measure discretionary consumer demand data because it is highly leading, while fully realizing that the volatile data provides amplified signals. Fortunately during the 2008 recession the BEA's numbers for the full economy eventually matched the discretionary consumer demand portion (that we measure) with embarrassing accuracy. While we know that we are measuring only one portion of the economy -- the quarterback in the above analogy -- we still feel that those measurements reliably lead the economy as a whole. And they should not be expected to predict exactly what the BEA's 1937 based methodologies eventually measure -- for those portions of the economy that really mattered in 1937. As the saying goes: our numbers are what they are. They are pure daily measures of on-line consumer demand for discretionary durable goods. If consumer demand decisions initiate 70% of all U.S. commerce, we would like to measure that demand as far "upstream" as possible. | |
| | August 10, 2010 - The Ghosts of Lapsed Stimuli: We have mentioned before that our year-over-year indexes are effected by both the current level of consumer activities and the year-ago levels of that same activity. Even if current levels remain dead flat, changing levels from the prior year can impact the year-over-year numbers. The bottom line, however, is that almost all economic measures ultimately use prior levels as reference points, and it is the annualized growth rates that we actually remember from the GDP reports. Nothing demonstrates this phenomenon more clearly than our Automotive Index, which experienced a tremendous upward spike at this time last year from the 'cash for clunkers' stimulus package. Looking back at the chart for that index from a couple of months ago the spike is glaringly obvious:  Now fast forward to the current chart, where the upward 'blip' from the consumer oriented stimulus has inexorably shifted to the left and is half off the chart:  There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the above chart: ► Some portion of the recent drop in our Domestic Autos Sub-Index is the result of current consumer demand comparing poorly year-over-year to the level of stimulated demand during the year-ago period. ► The historical portions of the chart clearly show that a consumer oriented stimulus can have a measurable effect on select sectors of the economy. But, at least for domestic autos during this recovery: ► Without stimulus, significantly increased consumer demand has not been sustained. We see no signs of 'organic' or structural recovery yet in the either of two key durable goods sectors: Automotive and Housing:  The above chart is for the demand for new loans for newly acquired residential property (i.e., it excludes refinancing activities -- which have remained strong). Again the impact of consumer oriented stimuli can be seen in the historical left side of the chart, but the right side tells us a great deal about whether the stimuli actually primed the Housing pump, or merely moved sales forward several quarters. If Housing is to become a real engine of economic growth again, this chart would have to move back into substantially positive territory and stay there without benefit of congressional give-aways. Our year-over-year 'Daily Growth Index' continues to decline, and we expect the year-over-year data to continue to suffer during August because of the now lapsed year-ago stimulus packages: (Click on chart for fuller resolution) The numbers that go with the above chart are not good. Our 91-Day trailing 'quarter' 'Daily Growth Index' has dropped to a contraction rate of more than 4.5%, while the 183-Day trailing 'two quarters' is contracting at a more than 3% rate. To put these numbers in perspective, less than 3% of all quarters since 1947 have had GDP 'growth' that was worse. Additionally, fewer than 3% of any two consecutive quarters of GDP 'growth' have been worse than our trailing six months. Ignoring 2008 for the moment, the past quarter by itself would be something we might expect only once in every 7 or 8 years. We have revised our popular Contraction Watch to simplify and extend the comparison to the two most critical contractions: the 'Great Recession' of 2008 and the 2010 event that we have been watching unfold on a day by day basis: (Click on chart for fuller resolution) The two contraction events charted in the above graph are depicted using identical year-over-year methodologies, so the chart presents a true apples-to-apples comparison between contractions. The severity of each event is the area between the event's track and the gray 'zero' line, and the area of the 2010 event is now about half of the area traced by the 2008 episode. Clearly the 'Great Recession' of 2008 dropped to a more severe contraction rate than the current 2010 event. But the shape of the 2010 event remains troubling, with its daily level of contraction now having crossed the track of the 'Great Recession' event -- meaning that at about 210 days the 'Great Recession' had already recovered to the point far above the day to day level we are experiencing now. Looking at this chart we can also see that the 'Great Recession' had swung back into growth by 220 days, while the shape of the 2010 event indicates a probable duration that will be significantly longer. We may ultimately look back on 2008 as a relatively brief economic downturn that was a prelude to a much more prolonged event. | |
| | August 3, 2010 - 'Daily Growth Index' Turns Sharply Down: Since last week our 'Daily Growth Index' has dropped significantly, putting the trailing 91-day moving 'quarter' at a contraction level that would place a similar calendar quarter of GDP growth below the 5th percentile of all quarters since 1947. Under normal circumstances we might expect a quarter that bad once in slightly over 5 years:  The chart above clearly shows that things were much better one year ago, when the recovery was peaking in late August and early September of 2009. At that time the Daily Growth Index was above the 70th percentile, meaning that at that happy time of full blown recovery only roughly 1 in 4 quarters since 1947 had been happier. The decline during in the 4th quarter of 2009 was spectacular, and it has been steady throughout 2010. For those of you who are curious, the last time that our 'Daily Growth Index' passed the 5th percentile on the way down was on July 16th, 2008. More telling perhaps for economic forecasts is that the longevity of the current contraction is somewhat rarer than its nominal severity. Our 183-day moving 'two consecutive quarters' growth index would place that 6-month span in the 4th percentile of consecutive quarters since 1947. Only roughly one in every 25 six-month periods since the first Truman Administration would have been worse. The lingering nature of the current contraction can be seen in our Contraction Watch: (Click on chart for fuller resolution) This chart compares three consumer demand contraction 'events' that we have tracked: 2006 when consumer demand went negative but the GDP stayed just barely positive, the 2008 'Great Recession', and the current 2010 contraction that first sent our 'Daily Growth Index' negative on January 15th, 2010. The above graph charts all three events on a daily basis, with the first dates of respective negative growth aligned on the left margin. As we approach 200 days of contraction the 2010 event is now worse on a day-by-day basis than either of the two earlier slowdowns, and unlike the prior two events the current one has not yet formed a bottom. We have said before that one measure of the pain caused by an economic contraction is the area between the respective event lines in the above chart and the gray '0.0%' horizontal line. By this measure the current contraction is over two and a half times as severe as the 2006 event and nearly half as bad as the 'Great Recession' (which had returned to net 'Daily Growth Index' growth after 220 days). And a glance at the above chart tells us that the 2010 contraction is figuratively in 'uncharted' territory, behaving very unlike either 2006 or 2008. After nearly 200 days of contraction, the 2010 event is now less than a month from surpassing the 'Great Recession' in longevity, with no end in sight. We have also commented before that there can be a divergence between the levels of consumer shopping activity and the quality of the transactions themselves. In short, consumers may increase 'feel good' spending while still maintaining tighter long term budgets. The divergence occurs when consumers distinguish between spending from pocket change and taking on new or increased debt. Our sector indexes are weighted by transaction volumes, without regard for the 'quality' (or economic impact) of those transactions. Our 'Weighted Composite Index' (and consequently our 'Daily Growth Index'), on the other hand, weights each transaction according to the impact that that transaction will ultimately have on the GDP. Divergences between the sector indexes and the 'Weighted Composite Index' can occur either way, and they can tell us a great deal about consumer attitudes. Over the past two months there has been such a divergence, with the quality of the transactions weakening (i.e., our 'Weighted Composite Index' and 'Daily Growth Index' showing contraction) as the quantity of the transactions increased (i.e., the sectors showing growth). During that time our 'Weighted Composite Index' was substantially weaker than most of the sectors, and on a number of occasions it was weaker that all of the sectors. We mentioned at the time that we believed that social 'feel good' spending was occurring even as consumers were deleveraging by avoiding big ticket durable goods that require increased credit. Very recently a majority of the sector indexes have also begun to show year-over-year contraction. This may be a sign of consumers currently reducing even the smaller ticket 'feel good' spending. And the ultimate big ticket Housing Sector has moved back into significantly negative territory:  This is in spite of a continued upturn in Refinancing activity:  and is the result of the continued poor levels of loans for newly purchased residential housing: Again, the historically low mortgage rates engineered by the Federal Reserve may only be benefiting those of sufficient means that by refinancing they can 'invest' their liquid assets at effective yields far above CD or money market rates, ironically shrinking the money supply that the low interest rates were originally designed to grow. | |
| Commentary Date | Commentary Title | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010-09-01 | September 1, 2010 - Viewing the "Great Recession" in Hi-Def | ||
| 2010-08-28 | August 28, 2010 - Inside the BEA's Latest GDP Numbers | ||
| 2010-08-20 | August 20, 2010 - Politics and the Economy; Cause and Effect |
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